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Sammendrag 
Innvandringen til Norge har økt gradvis og netto innvandringen har gjennomgående vært positiv og 
økende siden 1970. Etter utvidelsen av EU i 2004 har innvandringen skutt fart og har svingt rundt 
70 000 i senere år. På 1970-tallet iverksatte myndighetene tiltak for å dempe innvandringen til Norge. 
På 1980-tallet var det en viss liberalisering igjen av politikken. Siden 1994 har endringen i innvand-
ringen blitt sterkt påvirket av Norges tilknytning til EU. I denne studien analyserer vi hvordan ulike 
politiske tiltak og endringer i økonomiske omstendigheter har påvirket innvandringen til Norge. Tall 
for brutto innvandring fra i prinsippet alle land i verden til Norge fra 1969 til 2010 studeres.  
 
I økonomisk forskning om migrasjonsstrømmer finnes det en standardmodell for individers 
flyttebeslutninger. Modellen vektlegger økonomiske forhold i hjemlandet sammenliknet med 
forholdene dit man vurderer å flytte. Forskjeller i hva man vil tjene spiller en rolle, men også 
mulighetene for å få seg arbeid dit man kommer betyr noe. Kostnadene ved å flytte og etablere seg 
spiller åpenbart en rolle for om det er verd å flytte. Her kommer kulturelle og språklige forskjeller inn. 
I noen sammenhenger har økonomiske forhold liten betydning for beslutningene fordi man flykter av 
politiske grunner fra ett land til andre land, eller det kan være familiære bånd som motiverer flytting.  
 
I tråd med mange studier av innvandring finner vi at økonomiske bakgrunnsvariabler har betydning for 
innvandring til Norge. Inntektsforskjellene mellom Norge og utlandet inngår med det forventede 
fortegnet og også forskjeller i fordelingen av inntekt spiller en rolle. Jo skjevere inntektsfordelingen i 
Norge er sammenliknet med i opprinnelseslandet, jo større blir innvandringen. Også arbeidsmarkeds-
situasjonen i Norge har betydning. Er arbeidsløsheten i Norge lav, vil det komme flere til Norge. Vi 
har kun data for arbeidsmarkedssituasjonen i noen av landene vi studerer, men for disse viser 
resultatene at høyere ledighet i opprinnelseslandet øker innvandringen til Norge.  
 
Vi finner også at mange innvandringspolitiske tiltak har hatt den forventede effekten. Det gjelder for 
eksempel innvandringsstoppen som formelt ble innført i 1975. Vi har estimert at dette inngrepet hadde 
en stor og langvarig betydning for samlet innvandring til Norge. Også den videre innstramming i 
regelverket som skjedde i 1977 har dempet innvandringen, mens liberaliseringen i 1981, som 
forventet, bidro til høyere innvandring enn hva vi ellers ville ha fått. I tiden rundt 1990 var det mange 
spesielle begivenheter som påvirker innvandringen til Norge. Vi finner at både norsk deltakelse i EØS 
i 1994 og Schengen-avtalen fra 2001 bidro til økt innvandring, men særlig utvidelsen av EU i 2004 har 
hatt stor betydning for innvandringen til Norge. EU-utvidelsen i 2007 har ytterligere økt 
innvandringen til Norge. Innstramming i reglene for familiegjenforening i 2008 har hatt en betydelig 
effekt på innvandringen ifølge vår analyse. 
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1. Introduction 
Immigration to more developed nations has increased significantly for several decades. In Europe the 
breakdown of the “iron curtain” affected migration flows, as has EU enlargements, which brought 
many former East-European countries into a common labour market. Although Norway is not a 
member of the EU, it is part of the European Economic Area (EEA) and consequently part of the 
common European labour market. Norway is thus affected by migration flows in Europe just as any 
other EU-country and migration to Norway from EU-countries has increased significantly in recent 
years. While Norway historically was a country with more emigration than immigration, the opposite 
has been the case more recently. Indeed, Norway together with Ireland was one of the countries with 
the highest rate of emigration during last decades of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th 
century. This changed with more restrictive immigration policies in the US from the 1920s and the 
depression of the 1930s. Until around 1970 net immigration to Norway was negative or small. From 
around 1970 net immigration has been positive and gradually increasing, cf. Figure 1. With a total 
population of roughly 4.9 million in 2010 net immigration increased the Norwegian population by 0.8 
percent that year. 
Figure 1. Migration to Norway. 1951−2010 
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Figure 2 shows the reported motives for immigration to Norway since 1990, when the collection of 
these statistics started, as defined by reason for the residence permit granted.1 We see that the number 
of persons admitted following an application for asylum has varied around a fairly constant level. The 
                                                     
1 From 1 October 2009 non-Nordic citizens of the European Union (except Bulgarians and Romanians) only need to declare 
the main purpose of the stay when registering with the Norwegian authorities.  
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peak in 1993 is related to the war in Bosnia while the 1999-peak is mostly related to the Kosovo 
conflict. Student immigration to Norway has been steadily increasing from a low level. The number of 
people who come for work used to be at the same, quite low level, but has increased dramatically since 
the expansion of the EU in May 2004. Family reunion has been an important reason for immigration 
but is related to the other reasons and in particular to those who come for work or seeking protection. 
Note that these statistics do not include immigrants who are citizens of another Nordic country 
because they have had free access to Norway since 1957 and do not have to state any reason for 
immigrating when registering with the Population register.2 Also, the statistics do not include intended 
stays of less than six months. 
Figure 2. Immigration to Norway by registered reason for immigration1 1990-2009 
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1 Does not include citizens of the other Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden) 
 
From the mid 1970s immigration policy became a new theme in Norwegian politics and attempts at 
restricting immigration were put in place by a new law. Later various additional measures have been 
introduced, but not all of these have been restrictive. Some have been of a more liberal nature. From 
1994 and onwards immigration into Norway has been affected by Norway joining the EEA. In this 
paper we study the effects of various immigration policy measures on immigration to Norway from all 
countries in the world using a macro data panel from 1969 to 2010. Policies have not been uniform 
across countries so we specify and test country specific or region specific policies. In order to do this 
we translate various immigration policies into a set of dummies for each policy. We shall return to this 
in Section 3 of the paper. 
                                                     
2 Citizens of other countries need a residence or work permit and the basis for granting the permit is registered by UDI. 
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There are many studies that analyse migration based on a single destination country. The study by 
Clark et al. (2007) for the United States and by Hatton (2005) for the United Kingdom, both find 
evidence for the role of immigration policies. Karemera et al. (2000) study migration to North 
American destinations while Mayda (2010) studies migration to 14 OECD countries. See also Massey 
et al. (1993) for a description of various theories of migration. A number of variables have been 
suggested as driving forces in these migration studies. Some relate to cultural and linguistic factors 
while other take on a more economic perspective and focus on differences in economic opportunities 
such as income and labour market features. Our main focus is to analyse how changes to Norwegian 
immigration policies have influenced migration to Norway during the previous four decades. We 
incorporate some of the main ideas in previous studies of migration, and test if migration policies in 
Norway can explain some of the changes in immigration flows over time and from particular countries 
or groups of countries. Using a panel of 179 countries with statistics from 1969 to 2010 we conclude 
that not only do economic variables explain changes in migration to Norway over time but some of the 
major policy changes that have taken place are also important in understanding immigration to 
Norway.  
 
In the next section we present our modelling framework while the third section discusses the data and 
in particular how we have created the policy intervention dummies that are linked to various 
immigration policies. The fourth section presents our main results and a number of sensitivity tests. 
We conclude in section five. 
2. Modelling framework 
Our basic model dates back to Roy (1951) and is elaborated by Borjas (1987). For a recent application 
see Mayda (2010). There are two countries: (o)rigin and (d)estination. The log of wages that an 
individual living in the origin country would receive if not migrating (wo) is assumed to be  
 
log( ) ,o o ow μ ε= +  where  2~ (0, ).o oNε σ                                          (1) 
Here 0μ  is interpreted as determined by individual observables such as education, gender etc., while 
0ε  captures unobservable characteristics with zero mean and a constant variance. For individuals who 
immigrate there is a similar wage model in the destination country 
 
log( ) ,d d dw μ ε= +  where  2~ (0, ).d dNε σ                                          (2) 
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The error terms are possibly correlated with a correlation coefficient ρ . Hatton (2005) and Clark et 
al. (2007) let the 'sμ depend linearly on skill which is also assumed to be distributed normally so that 
log( )ow and log( )dw are also normally distributed.  
 
The decision to immigrate or not is determined by the sign of an index I : 
 
( ) ( )log ( ) .d o d o d oI w w c μ μ δ ε ε= + ≈ − − + −                                      (3) 
 
Here c  is the level of mobility costs while δ  is the wage equivalent mobility cost. Immigration 
occurs if the value of the index I is positive. Summing over all individuals in the origin country, the 
emigration probability, P , from the origin country is given by 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )Pr 1 / / .d o d o d o d oP ε εε ε μ μ δ Φ μ μ δ σ Φ μ μ δ σ= − > − − − = − − + + = − −        (4) 
 
Here, εσ  is the standard deviation of the difference of the error terms, ,d oε ε ε= −  and Φ  is the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function. Equation (4) captures some important features of 
empirical models of immigration. Higher income in the origin country lowers P , while higher income 
in the destination country increases P . In addition, the income effects are the same but with opposite 
signs. The variance of  ε is given by 
 
2 2 2 2 .d o doεσ σ σ σ= + −                                                              (5) 
 
If the destination country has a more equal distribution of income than the origin country, and this 
would usually be the case when Norway is the destination country, an increase in inequality in the 
destination country will lower εσ .
3 If the term in the brackets in (4) is negative so that the income in 
the destination country is higher than in the origin country adjusted for migration costs, an increase in 
destination inequality will increase immigration as argued for by Borjas (1987), Hatton (2005), and 
Clark et al. (2007). Borjas (1987) was the first to include the income distribution as a feature affecting 
migration. He finds that countries with more income inequality have lower emigration rates. For this  
                                                     
3 Note that ( )d d oε εσ σ σ σ σ∂ ∂ = −  when dε  and oε  are assumed to be perfectly correlated. 
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to be the case there must be a strong positive correlation between earnings for immigrants in the origin 
and the destination countries and less income inequality in the destination country. If the mean income 
in the destination country is higher than in the origin country – which is a major motive for emigration 
in the first place – and inequality increases in the origin country, then high-income persons in that 
country will have fewer incentives to emigrate while low-income persons in the origin country are not 
affected. Total emigration is then reduced. Thus, changes in the distribution of income in the origin 
country select or motivate on average different people to emigrate.4 Mayda (2010) argues for including 
also a quadratic term of relative income inequality and finds empirical support for this specification. 
Also Hatton (2005) and Clark et al. (2007) find significant effects of variables characterising the 
income distribution in their models.  
 
P in (4) is the emigration probability defined as emigration divided by the relevant population in the 
origin country or the emigration rate. If a model is specified using the number of emigrants as the 
endogenous variable while the size of the population of the origin country enters as a regressor, this 
restriction can be tested. This is done by Karemera et al. (2000) who include the (log) population in 
the emigration equation but their results do not support using the emigration rate specification. Kim 
and Cohen (2010) combine the specification in (4) into a gravity model. Let odM denote the number 
of immigrants at any time from country o to country d , oP  the population of the origin and dP the 
population in the destination, the simplest gravity model is 
 
, ,od o d odM kP P d o d= ≠                                                              (6) 
 
where k is a constant and odd refers to the distance between o and .d  The standard specification used is 
achieved by dividing by oP on both sides of Eq. (6) so the added feature of the gravity model is really  
the inclusion of the population of the destination country. Kim and Cohen (2010) test the restriction of 
unit elasticities of the population terms in the equation and generally reject the restriction; although in 
several versions their estimate of the elasticity of oP  is not far from one.
5  
 
                                                     
4 When εσ goes towards infinity it follows from (4) that the emigration probability goes towards 0.5. Thus in this case the 
individual acts as if he tosses a coin whether he should emigrate or stay.  
5 However, in the current paper we do not relate our model to the gravity specification. 
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Higher monetary costs of migration relative to income in the destination country reduce migration 
according to the model in (4). A theoretical model of the effects of mobility costs is the focus of 
Carrington et al. (1996). The idea here is that mobility costs decrease with the number of migrants 
already settled in the destination country because they send information about job and housing markets 
to friends and family in the origin country and generally provide a network for new entrants. The 
empirical specification of mobility costs is a central part of econometric analyses of immigration. 
Standard proxies used are language differences, geographical distance, and migration policy 
indicators. It is common to include social indicators like crime and corruption indicators of political 
systems in order to explain migration flows. Several studies referred to earlier use more or less these 
variables in their econometric specifications. We proxy these factors using the number of resident 
immigrants by country divided by the Norwegian population as one indicator for migration costs. In 
addition our model includes fixed effects for all countries to capture other country specific factors. We 
also allow for these factors to change over time by including country specific time trends.   
3. Data and specification of immigration policies 
Statistics on demographic and economic variables 
Statistics for immigration to Norway from every country in the world are readily available in the 
statistics database, “Statbank” on the webpage of Statistics Norway.6 We have chosen to model 
immigration by country of departure and not citizenship. Statistics on immigrants by citizenship are 
available, but that series starts much later and makes the study of immigration policies before 1986 
impossible.7 Also it is not entirely clear what to prefer in our context. An Ethiopian who has lived in 
Sweden for some time may just as well be motivated by the same factors as a Swede even if the policies 
that apply to him/her are different (if (s)he has not acquired Swedish citizenship). Statistics on the stock 
of immigrants by country is also found in this database.   
 
For a number of the countries in the world, immigration to Norway does not take place every year. In 
fact for some small islands in the Pacific and Caribbean migration to Norway is a rare event. To take 
one example: during the period 1969 – 2010 there are four years of recorded immigration to Norway 
from Samoa. In these cases we have simply excluded the country from our list. We have also excluded 
countries where immigration never reaches 5 persons in any year. For some countries where 
                                                     
6 http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/00/00/10/innvandring_en/ 
7 With one exception noted below the fact that the regulations apply to country of citizenship and not of previous residence is 
not expected to influence the results. 
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immigration is quite regular, there are also some years with no recorded immigration. These zero 
observations have been excluded from the sample in line with Kim and Cohen (2010). Table B2 shows 
the number of observations by country included in the sample.8  
 
Population statistics for all countries have been taken from United Nations, Population Division.9 The 
statistics for Norway have been taken from the Statbank, as referred to earlier.  
 
For economic statistics we rely on relative income measured by GDP per capita in PPPs and current 
US dollars based on Penn World Tables cf. Heston et al. (2011). We use GDP-figures in nominal 
terms as it is relative GDP-levels that are used in the model. We have also included the unemployment 
rate in Norway.10 These figures are taken from OECD-databases and usually go back to 1970. Income 
data are problematic. We have relied on three main sources of information. High quality data, 
sometimes even going back before 1970, are generally available for countries taking part in the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).11 For most countries however, we rely on the WIDER database.12 
For Latin-American countries we also use data from the SEDLAC homepage.13 The WIDER database 
indicates data quality by using a scale from 1 to 4. When possible we rely mostly on high quality data 
but have tried to make our coverage as complete as possible. In general, data are better and 
comparable the more recent they are. For some countries there are comparable figures only for a few 
years. These are used to calibrate the level and lower quality data are used to interpolate between these 
years. When also these are missing linear interpolation is used.  
Immigration policies and legislation in Norway 
We now turn to how we have translated Norwegian immigration policies into quantitative variables. 
First, we emphasise that immigration from the other Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland and 
Sweden) has not been affected by any policy changes after the establishment of a Nordic passport 
union in 1957, which gave Nordic citizens free access to all the Nordic countries without needing 
                                                     
8 In Table B4 we list the countries that are excluded from our analysis. 
9 World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision - Extended CD-ROM Edition. 
WPP2008_ASCII_FILES/WPP2008_DB02_POPULATIONS_ANNUAL 
10 In some subsample estimations we also exploit the unemployment level in the origin country. For many countries in the 
sample no reliable unemployment data have been found and the sample where unemployment in the origin country is 
included is therefore much smaller than the total sample.   
 
11 Data can be found on http://www.lisdatacenter.org/data-access/keyfigures/ 
12 Cf. UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database, Version 2.0c, May 2008 available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/. 
LIS data is also included in the WIDER database. 
13 http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar. Database updated by April 2011. 
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passports, resident permits or work permits. It is also possible for Nordic citizens to commute or 
immigrate to Norway for short term stays, e.g. to work, without even having to register with the 
population register that represents the main source of the immigration statistics used in this study. 
Consequently, no changes in immigration policies affect Nordic citizens.  
Table 1. An overview of policy dummies and their expected sign in the econometric model  
DDUM1974 Ban on general work permits. All countries. Negative  
DUM1977 Residence permits not granted to illegally entrants. All countries. Negative 
DUM1981 Residence permits for immigrant students and school attendants. They were also 
given work permits. More liberal rules for family reunions. All countries. Positive  
DUM1991 Easier family reunion, work permits given to applicants for residence. All countries. 
Positive 
DUM1994 Norway joins the EEA. EEA-citizens free access. Positive  
DUM1997 Liberalisation related to the Geneva-convention. Refugees. Positive 
DUM1998 Liberalisation for refugees. Positive 
DUM1999 New law on human rights. UN convention on women and children. Positive 
DUM2000A Easier access for people with specialist competence. Positive 
DUM2000B Easier access for Iraqis. Positive 
DUM2001A  Schengen-convention. Liberalisation for Schengen member countries (”S”)  
DUM2001B Schengen-convention may affect immigration from non-Schengen countries (“O”) 
negatively 
DDUM2003 Liberalisation in 1997 tightened in 2003. Affecting mostly people from Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Somalia and countries in former Yugoslavia. Negative  
DDUM2004 Extension of EU included Czech republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Positive for these countries 
DUM2005 Easier access for Vietnamese refugees on the Philippines and Iraqis. Positive 
DUM2006 More restrictive rules for family reunion for immigrants arriving on tourist visa. 
Negative for non-EU countries 
DUM2007EU New EU members: Bulgaria and Romania. Positive for these two countries 
DUM2007A New EU members from 2004 included in the Schengen area. Positive 
DUM2007B Residence for certain asylum seekers. Positive 
DUM2008 Stricter economic demands for family reunion. Negative 
DUM2009A Temporary and transition rules applying to new (from 2004) EU members lifted. 
Positive effect for countries affected by Dummy 2004. 
DUM2009B Switzerland joins Schengen. Positive 
 
Out of a large number of changes to laws and regulations listed on the home page of the Norwegian 
Directorate of Immigration14 we have selected 21 as basis for specifying policy dummies to capture 
various aspects of policy changes, where some changes apply to all countries, some to a group of 
countries and, sometimes only to very few or even a single country. Since some of the policy changes 
are partly overlapping in time, one cannot include too many of the policy dummies in the model 
specification. Table 1 summarises the policy variables included in our study. We have included what 
we regard as the most important policy changes. We disregard minor changes such as higher visa fees  
                                                     
14 http://www.udi.no/Oversiktsider/Statistikk-og-analyse/FoU---rapporter1/Historisk-oversikt-over-regelverksendringer-/.  
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(which are anyway quite moderate). A certain element of subjectivity must of course be used when 
choosing what to include and what to exclude and here we have relied on expert advice from the 
immigration authorities in our selection of policy changes. The presentation of the policy changes in 
Table 1 gives an idea of the level of detail that we address and implicitly what we have excluded in the 
sense that other changes are not judged as being important enough on a priori grounds relative to those 
we have included. We refer to Appendix C for a more detailed explanation of the policy dummies. We 
should also note by specifying changes as step dummies we cannot be sure that we actually capture a 
policy change. The step dummies could in principle capture other changes affecting immigration. We 
do try to address this issue to some extent with robustness checks in Section 4. 
4. Model and empirical results  
In this paper we consider a specification of the following type:15  
 
.Ii,2010,...,1969t
;)1966t(DUMSOMALIADUMLIBERIA
DUMCHILEINTERVGINIRATIOGINIRATIO
URURNOR)/GDPCAPNORlog(GDPCAP
)/PNORlog(IS)P/Mlog()P/Mlog(
145
itiit3t2
t1it
2
it7it6
1-ti,51-t42-t2-ti,5
1-t1-ti,21t,i1t,i1t,it,i
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+−+++
++++
+++
++=
−−
εδμρρ
ργββ
βββ
ββ
                        (7) 
 
The left hand side variable in Eq. (7) is the log of the (scaled) gross immigration rate (gross immigration to 
Norway divided by the population) of country i in year t. As explanatory variables we have, in addition to 
the lagged endogenous variable, six “incentive” variables and a country-specific vector of intervention 
variables, .INTERVit  Finally we have added (i) some dummy variables to account for large residuals for 
some countries (Chile, Liberia and Somalia), (ii) country specific fixed effects, ,μ (iii) linear country-
specific deterministic trends,δ , and (iv) a genuine white noise error term, .ε  The incentive variables are:  
 
(i) the log of the ratio between the immigration stock of country i and the Norwegian 
population (IS/PNOR) lagged one year, to capture effects on immigration costs in that a 
higher number of previous immigrants from a country will make it less costly for 
newcomers to settle in Norway, cf. Carrington et al. (2003), 
                                                     
15 We specify (7) with lags on the incentive variables corresponding to what we have ended up with in connection with our 
reference model. The lags were chosen such that the incentive variables entered the equation with the correct sign and as 
significant as possible. Furthermore, one may argue, from a theoretical point of view, that the immigrants probably need 
some time to assess relevant information in conjunction with an immigration decision.   
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(ii) the log of GDP per capita of country i divided by GDP per capita for Norway lagged two 
years, (GDPCAP/GDPCAPNOR) in order to capture the relative income effect, 
(iii) the unemployment rate in Norway (URNOR) lagged one year, to capture the effect of 
labour market slackness on migration, 
(iv) the unemployment rate in the origin country to capture the effects of labour market 
condition as a push factor behind emigration, 
(v) a second order polynomial in the ratio between the income distribution in the origin 
country and the income distribution of Norway to capture a selection mechanism behind 
immigration. 
 
The variables contained in the vector with intervention variables, ,INTERV  are those occurring in the 
text column of Table 2 after the variable DUMSOMALIA. For further information on these variables cf. 
Table 1, Table B1 and Appendix C. It is not uncommon to include fixed period effects in panel data 
models. However, in the current we have decided not to do so. Since the models already contain various 
time dummies that are assumed to influence the vast majority of countries and since all the model 
specifications involve the Norwegian  unemployment rate, inclusion of year dummies will raise 
questions of identification and lead to overparameterized models with unclear interpretation.   
 
145I denotes a set with 145 current country numbers that are listed in Table B2. The panel data set is 
unbalanced and Table B2 gives an overview of the effective number of observations for each country in 
145I . We have, as noted earlier, omitted some small countries and observations for which the number of 
immigrants to Norway in the current and previous year is less than five persons.16 
Main Empirical results 
Since we have information on foreign unemployment and income distribution only for a subset of 
countries these variables are not included in our basic model.17 Weighted least squares, with weights 
based on population size, is our main estimation method, but we also present estimates based on ordi-
nary least squares.18 We have not tested the assumption of exogenous policy dummies. Heuristically 
                                                     
16 Cappelen et al. (2011), who use the same data material as in the current paper, consider subsample estimation for different 
geographical areas. Such type of robustness analysis is not undertaken in this paper, but is viewed as a topic for further work. 
17 The reference model corresponds to the restricted case in Table 2. 
18 All the calculations have been done by means of TSP version 5.0, cf. Hall and Cummins (1995). This software program contains a 
module for panel data analysis. However, this routine has not been utilized since we (i) consider weighted regression and (ii) 
incorporate country-specific linear deterministic trend effects. Thus, we have estimated the model using the routine for weighted 
least squares. This is facilitated by including a large amount of deterministic variables that take care of country specific effects and 
country specific linear trends. We do not consider random effects models in this paper. Consistent estimation of random effects 
models with lagged endogenous variables requires instrumental variables. We leave this for future analysis. 
14 
we do have some arguments in support of exogeneity. All variables in the main model except the un-
employment and the policy dummies rate are trending. It is impossible to argue that the unemployment 
rate is correlated with the policy dummies. The first two restrictive dummies were introduced at a time 
when the unemployment rate was low by historical standards. The liberalisation in 1981 also took 
place at a time of low unemployment although slightly higher than in 1974 and 1977. The dummies 
that capture Norway's relationship to the EU are also not related to contemporaneous variables in the 
model. The 1994 enlargement affected several countries and Norway's decision not to join might pos-
sibly be related to economic factors (as in 1972 when there also was a no majority in a referendum). 
The enlargements in 2004 and 2007 clearly had nothing to do with Norwegian politics.  
 
The main empirical results are reported in Table 2.19 In the left part of this table we consider the 
unrestricted case and in the right part a restricted case. The restricted case is mainly obtained by 
excluding insignificant variables from the econometric specification.20 However, when economic 
variables enter with a correct sign, we have retained them in the models even if the attached estimated 
slope parameters are not very significant. The restricted specification cannot be rejected when tested 
against the unrestricted specification using an LR-test.21 Hence, in the following we only comment on 
the restricted case.  
 
As seen from Table 2 we obtain correct signs of the estimated effects of the lagged endogenous 
variable and the incentive variables. The effect of the lagged endogenous variable is large and highly 
significant. The lagged stock of immigrants from a specific country relative to the Norwegian 
population (log-transformed) enters significantly in the specification and with a positive sign as 
expected. GDP per capita relative to the level in Norway (with a two year lag and log-transformed) is 
included as suggested by theory, but its estimated slope coefficient only has a t-value of about 1.4 (in 
absolute value). The Norwegian unemployment rate enters significantly. An increase in the Norwegian 
unemployment rate decreases, ceteris paribus, immigration to Norway. 
                                                     
19We do not report estimates of the country-specific fixed effects and the country-specific linear trend effects in Table 2.  
20 All the country-specific fixed effects have been retained, as well as country-specific trend variables with estimates with t-
values higher than unity in absolute value.  
21 The unrestricted model contains 319 unknown parameters including the variance of the error term and has a log-likelihood 
value equal to −3,493.99. The corresponding figures for the restricted model are 233 and −3,506.17. Thus using an LR-test 
statistic the restricted model cannot be rejected against the unrestricted model. 
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Table 2. Empirical analysis of immigration to Norway from the entire world. Unrestricted and 
restricted specificationa 
Unrestricted case Restricted case Variable 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
log(M/P)t-1 0.592 46.940 0.598 49.169 
log(IS/PNOR)t-1 0.030 1.590 0.030 2.315 
log(GDPCAP/GDPCAPNOR)t-2 -0.038 -0.899 -0.046 -1.413 
URNORt-1 -0.060 -6.750 -0.059 -7.071 
DUMCHILE 1.466 3.482 1.414 3.407 
DUMLIBERIA 2.399 2.701 2.395 2.720 
DUMSOMALIA 1.790 2.995 1.814 3.112 
DNNORDIC×DDUM1974 -0.105 -3.479 -0.104 -3.694 
DNNORDIC×DUM1977 -0.063 -2.186 -0.059 -2.148 
DNNORDIC×DUM1981 0.073 2.662 0.075 3.354 
DNNORDIC×DUM1991 -0.099 -3.232 -0.096 -3.593 
DEEA×DUM1994 0.109 1.603 0.142 2.606 
DREFUGEE×DUM1997 0.788 3.637 0.800 4.029 
DNNORDIC×DUM1998 0.047 1.277 0.052 1.567 
DNNORDIC×DUM1999 -0.190 -4.844 -0.189 -4.900 
DUMMYIRAQ×DUM2000B -0.141 -0.408   
DNNORDIC×DUM2000A -0.075 -1.952 -0.074 -1.953 
DSCHENGEN×DUM2001A 0.123 1.727 0.140 2.059 
DNNORDIC×(1-DSCHENGEN)×DUM2001B 0.143 4.572 0.144 4.823 
DREFUGEE×DDUM2003 -0.088 -0.415   
DEXTEU×DDUM2004 0.885 4.560 0.900 6.271 
DVIETNAM×DUM2005 0.147 1.225 0.146 1.243 
DVISA×DUM2006 0.009 0.283   
DBULROM×DUM2007EU 0.493 2.060 0.502 2.129 
DEXTEU×DUM2007A 0.080 0.347   
DLIB×DUM2007B 0.062 1.580 0.073 2.487 
DSTRICT×DUM2008 -0.190 -5.984 -0.189 -6.145 
DTRANS×DUM2009A 0.254 1.058   
DSWI×DUM2009B 0.132 0.227   
   
Number of observations               4,220          4,220 
R2               0.947          0.946 
aLeft hand side variable log(M/P)t. For the definition of the variables in the text column see Table B1. 
 
We find that the majority of the policy intervention variables enter with the correct sign. For some of 
the intervention variables we find no significant effects. In Table 3 we give a qualitative overview of 
the obtained results. For the immigration regulations introduced in 1974 and 1977, respectively, the 
correct negative sign is obtained. The liberalisation introduced in 1981 has as expected a positive 
effect. For the liberalization policy launched in 1991 we obtain a significant estimate with the wrong 
sign. As explained in Appendix C the policy changes in 1991 consisted of both restrictive measures 
and liberalisations so the total estimated effect is perhaps not surprising.    
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Table 3. Expected and estimated sign of coefficients for policy variables. Restricted specificationa 
Variable Expected sign Estimated sign 
DNNORDIC× DDUM1974 Negative Negative 
DNNORDIC× DUM1977 Negative Negative 
DNNORDIC×DUM1981 Positive Positive 
DNNORDIC×DUM1991 Positive Negative 
DEEA×DUM1994 Positive Positive 
DREFUGEE×DUM1997 Positive Positive 
DNNORDIC×DUM1998 Positive Positive 
DNNORDIC×DUM1999 Positive Negative 
DNNORDIC×DUM2000A Positive Negative 
DSCHENGEN×DUM2001A Positive Positive 
DNNORDIC×(1-DSHENGEN)×DUM2001B Negative Positive 
DEXTEU×DDUM2004 Positive Positive 
DVIETNAM×DUM2005 Positive Positive 
DBULROM×DUM2007EU Positive Positive 
DLIB×DUM2007B Positive Positive 
DSTRICT×DUM2008 Negative Negative 
aLeft hand side variable log(M/P)t. For the definition of the variables in the text column see Table B1.  
 
A liberalization aimed at refugees was introduced in 1997. A correct sign is obtained for the estimated 
coefficient attached to this variable, and the estimate is significant. Also for the liberalization launched 
in 1998 we obtain the correct sign and a significant estimate. A wrong sign is obtained in connection 
with the liberalization in 1999. The Schengen area convention introduced in 2001 is expected to 
increase immigration to Norway from countries in the Schengen area but to lead to less immigration 
from the countries outside the Schengen area. Let us first consider the Schengen area. For this area we 
obtain the right positive sign, but, against intuition, the estimate of the effect for the non Schengen 
area is also positive and significant. The absolute value is equal to the estimate for the Schengen area. 
In 2003 a stricter regime for family-reunion was introduced. This intervention is restricted to influence 
potential immigrants from Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and countries in former Yugoslavia. We are 
unable to find any negative effect of this intervention variable. In 2004 there was an extension of the 
EU/EEA area with some new East-European countries. The consequence was that people from these 
new countries obtained easier access to Norway. Hence, the sign of the estimated effect is in 
accordance with our a priori expectation. The dummy that captures the positive immigration effect 
from Philippines and Iraq to Norway enters with the correct sign, but the effect is not very significant. 
In 2007 there was another extension of the EU/EEA area since Bulgaria and Romania were included. 
In accordance with our expectations we obtain a positive effect of this extension. The stricter demands 
for family reunion introduced in 2008 had, as expected, a significant negative influence. 
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We have also included dummies for Chile, Liberia and Somalia. A look at preliminary estimation results 
revealed that the residuals for these three countries were especially large in some years. Hence the dummy 
variables DUMCHILE, DUMLIBERIA and DUMSOMALIA are included to account for these large 
residuals.22 The estimates of the three attached parameters are all positive and significant. 
Table 4. Empirical analysis of immigration to Norway from the entire world. Restricted specifi-
cation. Model without incentive variables and model without trend variablesa 
Variable 
Reference (restricted) 
Without incentive 
variables 
Without trend 
variables 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
log(M/P)t-1     0.598 49.169 0.605 51.447 0.755 72.798 
log(IS/PNOR)t-1     0.030 2.315   0.057 5.264 
log(GDPCAP/GDPCAPNOR)t-2   -0.046 -1.413   0.264 13.498 
URNORt-1     -0.059 -7.071   -0.061 -7.005 
DUMCHILE     1.414 3.407 1.466 3.511 1.371 3.126 
DUMLIBERIA     2.395 2.720 2.318 2.616 2.206 2.456 
DUMSOMALIA     1.814 3.112 1.864 3.178 0.882 1.686 
DNNORDIC×DDUM1974    -0.104 -3.694 -0.088 -3.121 -0.082 -2.786 
DNNORDIC×DUM1977    -0.059 -2.148 -0.052 -1.904 0.024 0.845 
DNNORDIC×DUM1981    0.075 3.354 0.035 1.727 0.134 5.852 
DNNORDIC×DUM1991    -0.096 -3.593 -0.222 -12.923 0.015 0.535 
DEEADUM1994 0.142 2.606 0.138 2.520 0.082 1.708 
DREFUGEE×DUM1997    0.800 4.029 0.848 4.249 0.202 1.673 
DNNORDIC×DUM1998    0.052 1.567 0.161 5.482 0.106 3.086 
DNNORDIC×DUM1999    -0.189 -4.900 -0.141 -3.675 -0.192 -4.705 
DNNORDIC×DUM2000A     -0.074 -1.953 -0.073 -1.918 -0.069 -1.735 
DSCHENGEN×DUM2001A    0.140 2.059 0.136 1.999 0.249 3.952 
DNNORDIC×(1-DSCHENGEN)× 
DUM2001B    
0.144 4.823 0.102 3.505 0.189 6.032 
DEXTEU×DDUM2004    0.900 6.271 0.933 6.474 0.714 6.080 
DVIETNAM×DUM2005    0.146 1.243 0.121 1.022 0.156 1.669 
DBULROM×DUM2007EU    0.502 2.129 0.555 2.340 0.916 4.264 
DLIB×DUM2007B     0.073 2.487 0.119 4.134 0.098 3.199 
DSTRICT×DUM2008     -0.189 -6.145 -0.149 -4.899 -0.200 -6.164 
Number of observations          4,220       4,220       4,220 
R2            0.946       0.945       0.936 
a Left hand side variable log(M/P)t. For the definition of the variables in the text column see Table B1.  
 
In Table 4 we report estimation results for two special cases of the reference model. In the third column 
we report the estimates of a model where the parameters attached to the incentive variables are 
constrained to zero. The main impression is that the parameter estimates attached to the policy 
intervention variables are not much changed qualitatively by the zero restrictions. The sign of the  
 
                                                     
22The binary variable DUMCHILE is one in 1987 and 1988 and zero in all other years and affects only Chile. The binary 
variable DUMLIBERIA is one in 2003 and 2004 and zero in all other years and affects only Liberia. The binary variable 
DUMSOMALIA is one in the years 1988−2010 and zero in all the years before 1988 and affects only Somalia.  
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estimates are the same as in the reference specification. So the estimates of the effects of the intervention 
variables seem to be fairly robust with respect to whether the incentive variables are included or not.  
In the column next to the last of Table 4 we report the estimates of a model where all the country specific 
trend variables have been omitted. For this case we obtain a higher estimate of the coefficient attached to 
the lagged endogenous variable and a positive significant effect of the relative GDP-variable. Thus, the 
presence of country specific linear trends seems to be necessary in order to get the right sign of the relative 
GDP-effect. The model with omitted country specific linear trend variables contains 170 parameters 
(includeing the variance of the error term) and has a log-likelihood value equal to −3774.52. Thus if one 
tests this specification against the reference specification using an LR-test one obtains a χ2 value of 
561.06. The associated degree of freedom is 65. Hence, the specification without country specific trends is 
clearly rejected. 
 
Our main estimation method is weighted least squares with population as weights. The reason for this 
is that we are pooling countries that differ substantially in population size. We have also estimated the 
reference model with ordinary least squares. The results are reported in Table A1. Even if most of the 
estimates retain their sign they differ somewhat from those obtained when using weighted least 
squares with population weights and so does the estimation uncertainty. For instance the variable 
representing the immigration restrictions launched in 1977 still have the right sign, but the magnitude 
of the estimated slope coefficient of this variables has been almost halved and it has now turned 
insignificant. Thus, it makes a difference which estimation method that is used.23  
 
In the second column of Table B2 the effective number of observations for each country involved in 
the estimation of the main model is reported. For some of the countries the number of effective 
observations is rather low. In light of a potential problem of biased estimation stemming from few 
observations in the time dimension in dynamic models with fixed effects, cf. Nickell (1981), we have 
reestimated the main model after excluding countries with fever than 15 observations. The estimates in 
this case are reported in Table A2 and they show there is no substantial change in any of the estimates, 
which may imply that there is no “Nickell-bias”.  
                                                     
23 We have also estimated the reference model with weighted least squares using immigration weights. However, some of the 
results appear rather strange. The estimate of the slope parameter attached to the immigration stock now turns negative and 
besides the coefficient of the lagged endogenous variable is substantially lower than when weighted least squares is based on 
population weights. Finally, we have carried out weighted least squares using log population as weights. This variant 
produced results that resemble those obtained using ordinary least squares.  
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Changes in the income distribution  
As commented on earlier in the paper changes in the income distribution in both the origin and 
destination country may influence immigration. It is relevant to ask whether this effect is important 
from an empirical point of view. For 101 of the 145 countries considered when estimating the 
reference model we have access to time series for the Gini-coefficient. Using this subsample we 
reestimated the reference model after having added a second order polynomial in the ratio between the 
Gini-coefficient of the origin country and Norway. Whereas the reference model was estimated using 
4,220 observations the augmented model is estimated with 3,083 observations. The results are shown 
in Table 5. We obtain a significant positive estimate of the first order variable and a significant 
negative estimate of the quadratic term.24 Within our sample an increase in the inequality of the 
income distribution of the origin leads, mainly, to, an increase in the immigration to Norway. In this 
augmented model the estimate of the income ratio is smaller and substantially less significant than in 
the reference model, the t-value now being only around 0.4 in absolute value. Generally the estimates 
of the common parameters in the augmented and reference model are similar. We now get a smaller 
and insignificant estimate of the coefficient attached to the intervention directed towards refugees 
from 1997. This is not surprising since some of the countries influenced by this variable are omitted 
from the subset of data used in the conjunction with the subsample estimation. However, by and large, 
including variables on income inequality for a smaller set of countries with appropriate data, does not 
change our conclusions with regard to the qualitative effects of policy interventions.  
                                                     
24 From Eq. (7) we have that GINIRATIOit denotes the ratio between the Gini-coefficient in country i and Norway in year t. In 
the estimated regression the effect of the variable is specified as 26 72ˆ ˆit itGINIRATIO GINIRATIOβ β+ , where 
6
ˆ 0.935β = and 7ˆ 0.203β = − . Note that the derivative is given by 6 7ˆ ˆ2 GINIRATIOβ β+ . In our sample GINIRATIO 
varies between 0.697 and 2.915. An increase in GINIRATIO yields an increase in the immigration for most of the countries.  
However, when evaluating the term 6 7ˆ ˆ2 GINIRATIOβ β+  in the observed data points, we find that it is negative in at least 
one year for 24 countries.  
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Table 5. Empirical analysis of immigration to Norway. Models without and with time series of 
Gini-variablesa 
Without Gini-variables With Gini-variables Variable 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
log(M/P)t-1 0.598 49.169 0.583 40.391 
log(IS/PNOR)t-1 0.030 2.315 0.034 2.220 
log(GDPCAP/GDPCAPNOR)t-2 -0.046 -1.413 -0.017 -0.412 
URNORt-1 -0.059 -7.071 -0.053 -5.729 
GINIRATIO   0.935 4.753 
GINIRATIO SQUARED   -0.203 -3.601 
DUMCHILE 1.414 3.407 1.478 3.320 
DUMLIBERIA 2.395 2.720   
DUMSOMALIA 1.814 3.112   
DNNORDIC×DDUM1974 -0.104 -3.694 -0.092 -3.015 
DNNORDIC×DUM1977 -0.059 -2.148 -0.054 -1.809 
DNNORDIC×DUM1981 0.075 3.354 0.057 2.287 
DNNORDIC×DUM1991 -0.096 -3.593 -0.106 -3.554 
DEEA×DUM1994 0.142 2.606 0.147 2.488 
DREFUGEE×DUM1997 0.800 4.029 0.516 0.745 
DNNORDIC×DUM1998 0.052 1.567 0.069 1.896 
DNNORDIC×DUM1999 -0.189 -4.900 -0.209 -4.889 
DNNORDIC×DUM2000A -0.074 -1.953 -0.038 -0.902 
DSCHENGEN×DUM2001A 0.140 2.059 0.150 2.030 
DNNORDIC×(1-DSCHENGEN)× DUM2001B 0.144 4.823 0.153 4.592 
DEXTEU×DDUM2004 0.900 6.271 0.933 5.832 
DVIETNAM×DUM2005 0.146 1.243 0.168 1.178 
DBULROM×DUM2007EU 0.502 2.129 0.476 1.723 
DLIB×DUM2007B 0.073 2.487 0.061 1.846 
DSTRICT×DUM2008 -0.189 -6.145 -0.205 -5.560 
   
Number of observations               4,220         3,083 
R2               0.946         0.952 
a Left hand side variable log(M/P)t. For the definition of the variables in the text column see Table B1. Note that some of the variables in the 
text column have to be redefined when one considers estimation using data only for countries for which we have access to time series of Gini 
coefficients. For example DREFUGEE degenerates to an indicator dummy for Croatia, Macedonia and Slovakia since we, cf. Table B2, do 
not have income distribution data for Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Montenegro and Serbia.  
The importance of the unemployment rate in the origin country 
In the reference model the Norwegian unemployment rate enters as a significant explanatory variable 
with a negative sign. An interesting question is whether the unemployment rate in the origin country 
also plays a role. Unfortunately, we only have unemployment rates for a small group of selected 
countries, mostly OECD-countries. In Table 6 we consider a subsample estimation using data for 31 
countries in which we add the foreign unemployment rate lagged one year as an additional regressor.25 
As is seen from the left hand part of Table 6 we obtain a significant positive estimate of the 
unemployment level in the origin country and as before a negative coefficient for the Norwegian 
unemployment level. The difference in absolute value suggests that the two unemployment variables  
                                                     
25The countries are listed in Table B3.  
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should be specified as two separate variables in the regression. Just using the difference in the 
unemployment rates does not seem to be empirically valid. Note that for this subsample we obtain a 
significant negative estimate of the relative income variable as expected. However, we still struggle 
with some of the signs of the effects of the intervention variables, for instance the effects related to the 
two liberalization interventions in 1999 and 2000. In the right hand part of Table 6 we report results 
from a specification in which we also have added a second order polynomial in the Gini-coefficient 
ratio but the two involved variables are highly insignificant for this subset of countries.  
Table 6. Empirical analysis of immigration from countries for which one observes the origin 
unemployment levela 
Without Gini-variables With Gini-variables Variable 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
log(M/P)t-1 0.602 23.194 0.599 22.243 
log(IS/PNOR)t-1 0.057 1.741 0.071 1.940 
log(GDPCAP/GDPCAPNOR)t-2 -0.182 -2.656 -0.221 -2.853 
URNORt-1 -0.041 -4.571 -0.037 -3.907 
URt-1 0.009 2.505 0.008 2.153 
GINIRATIO   0.002 0.005 
GINIRATIO SQUARED   -0.007 -0.065 
DNNORDIC×DDUM1974 -0.056 -1.719 -0.060 -1.786 
DNNORDIC×DUM1977 -0.070 -2.436 -0.073 -2.509 
DNNORDIC×DUM1981 -0.042 -1.686 -0.050 -1.916 
DNNORDIC×DUM1991 0.093 3.184 0.084 2.786 
DEEA×DUM1994 0.058 1.945 0.061 1.985 
DNNORDIC×DUM1998 -0.045 -1.245 -0.039 -1.057 
DNNORDIC×DUM1999 -0.108 -2.481 -0.106 -2.389 
DNNORDIC×DUM2000A -0.116 -2.713 -0.118 -2.684 
DSCHENGEN×DUM2001A 0.202 4.410 0.191 4.001 
DNNORDIC×(1-DSCHENGEN)× DUM2001B 0.060 1.667 0.048 1.305 
DEXTEU×DDUM2004 0.815 6.877 0.794 6.455 
DLIB×DUM2007B -0.016 -0.408 -0.015 -0.374 
DSTRICT×DUM2008 -0.063 -1.479 -0.016 -0.338 
   
Number of observations               1,052 982 
R2               0.983 0.979 
a Left hand side variable log(M/P)t. For the countries included in this estimation see Table B4. For the definition of the variables in the text column see Table B1. 
Note that some of the variables in the text column are redefined when one considers estimation using data only for countries for which one has access to origin 
unemployment rates. For example DEXTEU is now one for Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia and zero for all other countries included in the estimation of 
the econometric relation. 
Some counterfactual exercises  
We now use the estimated model for counterfactual analysis. We will consider two policy changes. 
Simulation I tries to answer how immigration to Norway would have changed if the 1973-policy 
regime had been maintained in the subsequent years. The second policy analysis (Simulation II) 
addresses how Norwegian membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Schengen area 
has affected immigration. These analyses are not without problems. First, we are unable to obtain the 
“correct” sign of all the estimated parameters related to the intervention dummies, cf. Table 3.  
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Second, we implicitly will have to assume that the estimates of the slope parameters are not affected 
by the counterfactual situation. Third, the dataset is, as mentioned earlier, unbalanced, which creates 
problem for the dynamic simulation of all the countries in the model. Finally, it is a very partial 
exercise in that all other variables of the model are assumed unaffected. If immigration is higher, 
several of the right hand side variables might possibly be affected too and these changes are not 
included in the simulations. One obvious example is that a change which increases immigration will 
most likely also increase the stock of immigrants unless there is a similar increase in emigration. The 
latter effect is ignored in these simulations. The countries included in, respectively, Simulation I and 
Simulation II are listed in the two last columns of Table B2. The point of departure is the reference 
model.   
 
In Simulation I we study the “global” intervention effects and start the dynamic simulations in 1974. As 
a reference we simulate a model that corresponds to the restricted case in Table 2. For each year we 
deduce the total number of immigrants from the 70 countries indicated in the column next to the last in 
Table B2. In the counterfactual simulation we set, cf. Table B1, the following policy variables to zero: 
DDUM1974, DUM1977, DUM1981, DUM1997, DUM1998, DUM2007B and DUM2008.26 The 
simulation results are reported in Table 7. In the first column we report the reference path, whereas the 
counterfactual path is reported in the second column. The two last columns contain the difference in 
immigration between the counterfactual and the reference path in absolute and relative terms. In the 
1970s we note the impact of the restrictions launched in 1974 and 1977. Our estimate is that immigration 
to Norway due to these two policies was reduced by 28 percent by 1980. The effects increase over time 
due to the lagged responses of the policies. The 1981-liberalisation reduced the effects of the more 
restrictive policies significantly during the first half of the 1980s. The policies of the 1970s and early 
1980s thus seem to have reduced total immigration by roughly 16 percent. The liberalisation in 1998 
increases immigration further and by early 2000s the total effects of the mentioned policies have reduced 
immigration by only 5 percent compared to policies that were in place before 1974.  
 
If we look at the accumulated changes over three decades the total effect on immigration has been 
considerable. By 2010 total immigration was reduced by nearly 116 000 persons due to these 
immigration policies according to our model. But we should note the partial character of the simulations. 
Although some of the immigrants would have emigrated again, the stock of immigrants has been 
                                                     
26 Since the variables DNNORDIC×DUM1991, DNNORDIC×DUM1999, DNNORDIC×DUM200A and  
DNNORDIC×(1-DSCHENGEN)×DUM2001B enter with the wrong sign, we include them both in the reference and 
counterfactual simulations. Thus we refrain from interpreting these variables as intervention variables.    
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negatively affected by the policies. A lower stock of immigrants would have reduced the number of 
immigrants further since stocks of immigrants in Norway reduce transaction costs. On the other hand a 
higher number of immigrants may have increased unemployment and led later to fewer immigrants. 
These arguments simply add up to the need of analysing the issue within a much more complete “model” 
of the Norwegian society.     
Table 7. Counterfactual analysis of immigration to Norway (70 countries). Simulation Ia 
Year Reference 
pat
h 
Counterfactual 
path 
Absolute 
differ
ence 
Difference in 
perce
nt 
1974 16,969 18,066 1,097 6.5 
1975 17,626 19,584 1,958 11.1 
1976 17,807 20,301 2,494 14.0 
1977 17,613 21,167 3,554 20.2 
1978 18,023 22,360 4,337 24.1 
1979 18,165 22,978 4,813 26.5 
1980 18,350 23,497 5,147 28.0 
1981 19,953 24,589 4,636 23.2 
1982 20,781 25,019 4,238 20.4 
1983 20,830 24,730 3,900 18.7 
1984 20,147 23,727 3,580 17.8 
1985 20,229 23,716 3,487 17.2 
1986 21,296 24,907 3,611 17.0 
1987 23,660 27,686 4,026 17.0 
1988 25,999 30,492 4,493 17.3 
1989 24,482 28,636 4,154 17.0 
1990 21,929 25,639 3,710 16.9 
1991 19,220 22,380 3,160 16.4 
1992 17,739 20,613 2,874 16.2 
1993 16,776 19,476 2,700 16.1 
1994 16,966 19,732 2,766 16.3 
1995 17,886 20,831 2,945 16.5 
1996 19,298 22,502 3,204 16.6 
1997 21,889 25,392 3,503 16.0 
1998 25,959 28,992 3,033 11.7 
1999 26,463 28,773 2,310 8.7 
2000 25,975 27,752 1,777 6.8 
2001 28,362 30,083 1,721 6.1 
2002 30,417 32,102 1,685 5.5 
2003 31,635 33,276 1,641 5.2 
2004 32,676 34,344 1,668 5.1 
2005 34,633 36,409 1,776 5,1 
2006 37,572 39,152 1,580 4,2 
2007 47,901 47,908 7 0,0 
2008 52,562 55,407 2,845 5,4 
2009 55,288 60,296 5,008 9,1 
2010 57,657 63,934 6,277 10,9 
Sum 960,733 1,076,448 115,715 12,0 
aThe reference path corresponds to dynamic simulation starting in 1974 using the estimated parameters reported for the 
restricted case in Table 2. For the counterfactual path we set the values of the intervention variables DDUM1974, DUM1977, 
DUM1981, DUM1997, DUM1998, DUM2007B and DUM2008 to zero in all years and perform dynamic simulation. The 
countries involved are listed in the column next to the last in Table B2. 
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Simulation II captures effects of Norwegian membership in the EEA and the Schengen area which 
implies that the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 also affects Norway. We now start the 
simulations in 1994 to capture the first policy change. In this case simulations are done for the 139 
countries indicated in the last column of Table B1. Under the counterfactual simulations we put, cf. 
Table B1, the following variables to zero: DUM1994, DUM2001A, DDUM2004 and DUM2007EU 
keeping the other policy dummies as in the reference simulation. So we may interpret this simulation 
as showing the effect of Norway not joining the EEA and the further implications of not being 
associated to the EU system. The implication of the EEA membership in 1994 is quite modest 
according to our model. Immigration increased by roughly 5 percent. The effect of joining the 
Schengen area increases this rate somewhat during the early 2000s, but the really large effects come 
from the enlargement of EU in 2004. By 2006 immigration has increased by roughly 12 percent and 
the second enlargement with Bulgaria and Romania increases immigration even further so that the 
effect in 2010 was around 20 percent. If we accumulate these effects up till 2010 we notice that 
immigration to Norway has increased by 77 000 as a consequence of these policies compared to a 
counterfactual situation where Norway did not join at all.   
Table 8. Counterfactual analysis of immigration to Norway (139 countries). Simulation IIa 
Year Reference 
pat
h 
Counterfactual 
path 
Absolute 
differ
ence 
Difference in 
perce
nt 
1994 25,910 25,320 -590 -2.3 
1995 24,614 23,682 -932 -3.8 
1996 24,956 23,778 -1,178 -4.7 
1997 29,708 28,311 -1,397 -4.7 
1998 36,262 34,540 -1,722 -4.7 
1999 38,055 36,343 -1,712 -4.5 
2000 35,469 33,867 -1,602 -4.5 
2001 37,714 35,542 -2,172 -5.8 
2002 39,446 36,880 -2,566 -6.5 
2003 40,109 37,321 -2,788 -7.0 
2004 40,914 36,961 -3,953 -9.7 
2005 43,504 37,148 -6,356 -14.6 
2006 47,082 41,325 -5,757 -12.2 
2007 59,315 52,136 -7,179 -12.1 
2008 64,604 55,368 -9,236 -14.3 
2009 67,920 53,186 -14,734 -21.7 
2010 71,401 57,873 -13,528 -18.9 
Sum 726,983 649,581 -77,402 -10.6 
aThe reference path corresponds to dynamic simulation starting in 1994 using the estimated parameters reported for the 
restricted case in Table 2. For the counterfactual path we set the values of the intervention variables DUM1994, DUM2001A, 
DDUM2004 and DUM2007EU to zero in all years and perform dynamic simulation. The countries involved are listed in the 
last column of Table B2. 
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5. Conclusions 
Using unbalanced panel data we have modelled immigration to Norway from countries all over the 
world during the period 1969−2010. Our main focus has been to assess the effects of immigration 
policies on immigration to Norway. Immigration policies have been proxied using a number of time 
series dummy variables. These policy intervention variables have been included in a standard 
economic model of migration that accounts for the effects of incentive variables such as relative 
income, income distribution and labour market features. Unobserved country-specific heterogeneity is 
modelled by including country specific fixed effects and country specific linear trends in order to take 
into account geographical distance, culture and language differences and other fairly stable effects that 
might affect migration from individual countries to Norway.  
 
For the incentive variables we, abstracting from the income distribution variables, obtain estimates 
with the expected sign, even if the significance of some of the estimates is rather moderate. Even if 
many of the country-specific fixed effects and trend effects are insignificant, the presence of these 
variables seems to be important. When the country-specific trend effects are omitted a substantial drop 
in fit and less sensible estimates of the effects of the incentive variables are obtained. However, more 
parsimonious specifications of unobserved country-specific heterogeneity are a relevant topic for 
future research.  
 
The majority of policy intervention variables enter with the a priori expected sign, but for some of 
them we obtain counterintuitive results. In a counterfactual exercise we have investigated the effect of 
the general immigration policies that have been launched since 1974. As a rough estimate we find that 
the accumulated number of immigrations over then period 1974-2010 would have been about 116 000 
persons higher without these policies. In relative terms, the immigration would have increased with 12 
per cent if one had pursued a policy without the general immigration interventions.  
 
In another experiment we investigated the importance of Norway joining the European Economic 
Area in 1994 and the subsequent changes in immigration policy that followed from this step, that is the 
membership in the Schengen area and the enlargement of EU. Again as a rough estimate we found that 
the accumulated immigration over the time period 1994-2010 would have been 10 per cent lower 
without Norwegian involvement in the European Economic Area.   
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Appendix A: Additional estimation results  
Table A1. Empirical analysis of immigration to Norway. Restricted specification. Weighted 
regression and OLSa 
Explanatory variable Weighted regression Unweighted regression 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
log(M/P)t-1 0.598 49.169 0.531 42.198 
log(IS/PNOR)t-1 0.030 2.315 0.047 3.617 
log(GDPCAP/GDPCAPNOR)t-2 -0.046 -1.413 -0.019 -0.586 
URNORt-1 -0.059 -7.071 -0.048 -4.695 
DUMCHILE 1.414 3.407 1.591 5.522 
DUMLIBERIA 2.395 2.720 2.476 7.990 
DUMSOMALIA 1.814 3.112 1.854 6.337 
DNNORDIC×DDUM1974 -0.104 -3.694 -0.062 -1.480 
DNNORDIC×DUM1977 -0.059 -2.148 -0.030 -0.795 
DNNORDIC×DUM1981 0.075 3.354 -0.013 -0.441 
DNNORDIC×DUM1991 -0.096 -3.593 -0.061 -1.845 
DEEA×DUM1994 0.142 2.606 0.129 2.257 
DREFUGEE×DUM1997 0.800 4.029 0.458 3.755 
DNNORDIC×DUM1998 0.052 1.567 -0.005 -0.106 
DNNORDIC×DUM1999 -0.189 -4.900 -0.052 -1.010 
DNNORDIC×DUM2000A -0.074 -1.953 -0.113 -2.205 
DSCHENGEN×DUM2001A 0.140 2.059 0.111 1.612 
DNNORDIC×(1-DSCHENGEN)×DUM2001B 0.144 4.823 0.061 1.484 
DEXTEU×DDUM2004 0.900 6.271 0.759 10.113 
DVIETNAM×DUM2005 0.146 1.243 0.057 0.323 
DBULROM×DUM2007EU 0.502 2.129 0.525 2.932 
DLIB×DUM2007B 0.073 2.487 -0.025 -0.602 
DSTRICT×DUM2008 -0.189 -6.145 -0.099 -2.259 
     
Number of observations 4,220  4,220  
aLeft hand side variable log(M/P)t. For the definition of the variables in the text column see Table B1. Weights based on population size. 
28 
Table A2. Empirical analysis of immigration to Norway from the entire world. Countries with 
fewer than 15 observations omitted. Weighted least squares estimatesa 
Full sample Countries with more than 14 
observations 
Explanatory variable 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
log(M/P)t-1 0.598 49.169 0.605 48.569
log(IS/PNOR)t-1 0.030 2.315 0.028 2.095 
log(GDPCAP/GDPCAPNOR)t- -0.046 -1.413 -0.048 -1.465
URNORt-1 -0.059 -7.071 -0.059 -6.948
DUMCHILE 1.414 3.407 1.402 3.327
DUMLIBERIA 2.395 2.720 2.388 2.670
DUMSOMALIA 1.814 3.112 1.794 3.032
DNNORDIC×DDUM1974 -0.104 -3.694 -0.105 -3.666
DNNORDIC×DUM1977 -0.059 -2.148 -0.057 -2.033
DNNORDIC×DUM1981 0.075 3.354 0.074 3.280
DNNORDIC×DUM1991 -0.096 -3.593 -0.092 -3.395
DEEA×DUM1994 0.142 2.606 0.140 2.518
DREFUGEE×DUM1997 0.800 4.029 0.794 3.941
DNNORDIC×DUM1998 0.052 1.567 0.053 1.581
DNNORDIC×DUM1999 -0.189 -4.900 -0.190 -4.805
DNNORDIC×DUM2000A -0.074 -1.953 -0.074 -1.921
DSCHENGEN×DUM2001A 0.140 2.059 0.138 2.006
DNNORDIC×(1-
DSCHENGEN)×DUM2001B 
0.144 4.823 0.143 4.681
DEXTEU×DDUM2004 0.900 6.271 0.890 6.101
DVIETNAM×DUM2005 0.146 1.243 0.147 1.231
DBULROM×DUM2007EU 0.502 2.129 0.502 2.095
DLIB×DUM2007B 0.073 2.487 0.075 2.487
DSTRICT×DUM2008 -0.189 -6.145 -0.190 -6.013
     
Number of observations 4,220  3,956  
R2 0.946  0.949  
aLeft hand side variable log(M/P)t. For the definition of the variables in the text column see Table B1. Note that some of the variables in the 
text column are redefined when one omits countries with less than 15 observations. For instance since Slovenia is omitted DEXTEU is one 
for Czech republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Slovakia. 
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Appendix B: Details on data 
Table B1.  An overview of intervention dummies, the countries that are influenced by the va-
rious policy dummies and the expected sign of the effects of the dummy variables1  
Intervention 
dummies 
Country/Country area 
dummies  
Definition of country/country 
area dummies  
Description of 
intervention 
Expecte
d sign 
DDUM1974 DNNORDIC  DNNORDIC is 1 for all countries 
except Denmark, Finland, Iceland 
and Sweden.  
Ban on general work 
permits introduced in 
February 1974. All 
countries.  
Negative 
DUM1977 DNNORDIC   Residence permits not 
granted to illegally 
entrants. 
Negative 
DUM1981 DNNORDIC  Residence permits for 
immigrant students 
and school attendants. 
They were also given 
work permits. More 
liberal rules for 
family reunions. 
Positive 
DUM1991 DNNORDIC  Easier family reunion, 
work permits given to 
applicants for 
residence. 
Positive 
DUM1994 DEEA DEEA is one for Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and United 
Kingdom 
Norway joins the 
EEA. EEA-citizens 
free access. 
Positive 
DUM1997 DREFUGEE  DREFUGEE is one for 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and 
for countries in former 
Yugoslavia. 
Liberalisation related 
to the Geneva-
convention. Refugees.  
Positive 
DUM1998 DNNORDIC  Liberalisation for 
refugees. 
Positive 
DUM1999 DNNORDIC  New law on human 
rights. UN convention 
on women and 
children. 
Positive 
DUM2000A DNNORDIC  Easier access for 
people with specialist 
competence. 
Positive 
DUM2000B DIRAQ DIRAQ is 1 for Iraq Easier access for 
people from Iraq. 
Positive 
DUM2001A DSCHENGEN DSCHENGEN is one for Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain  
Schengen-convention. 
Liberalisation for 
Schengen member 
countries.  
Positive 
DUM2001B (1-DSCHENGEN)* 
DNNORDIC 
 Schengen-convention. 
Possible tigthening 
for countries outside 
the Schenger-area.  
Negative 
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Table B1 (Cont.)  
Intervention 
dummies 
Country/Country 
area dummies  
Definition of country/country 
area dummies  
Description of 
intervention 
Expecte
d sign 
DDUM2003 DREFUGEE DREFUGEE is one for 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and 
for countries in former 
Yugoslavia. 
Liberalisation in 1997 
tightened in 2003. 
Negative 
DDUM2004 DEXTEU DEXTEU is one for Czech 
republic, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
Extension of EU Positive 
DUM2005 DVIETNAM DVIETNAM is one for Irag and 
Philippines 
Easier access for 
Vietnamese refugees 
to the Philippines and 
Iraq. 
Positive 
DUM2006 DVISA DVISA=(1-DEEA)*(1-
DEXTEU)* 
DNNORDIC 
More restrictive rules 
for family reunion for 
immigrants arriving 
on tourist visa from 
non-EU countries. 
Negative 
DUM2007EU DBULROM DBULROM is one for Bulgaria 
and Romania 
New EU members Positive 
DUM2007A DEXTEU See DDUM2004 New EU members in 
2004 included in 
Schengen area 
Positive 
DUM2007B DLIB DLIB=(1-DEEA)*(1-DEXTEU)* 
(1-DBULROM)*DNNORDIC 
Residence given for 
asylum seekers not 
able to return 
Positive 
DUM2008 DSTRICT DSTRICT=(1-DEEA)*(1-
DEXTEU)* 
(1-DSWI)*DNNORDIC, where 
DSWI is one for Switzerland and 
0 otherwise 
Stricter economic 
demands for family 
reunion. 
Negative 
DUM2009A DTRANS DTRANS is one for Czech 
republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Temporary transition 
rules applying to new 
(from 2004) EU 
members lifted 
(except Cyprus and 
Malta) 
Positive 
DUM2009B DSWI  Switzerland joins the 
Schengen-area 
Positive 
1 DUMj (j=1977, 1981, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000A, 2000B, 2001A, 2001B, 2005, 2006, 2007EU, 2007A, 2007B, 2008, 2009A, 2009B) is a 
dummy variable that is 0 before the year indicated and 1 from this year on. DDUM1974 is a dummy variable that is 0 before 1974, equal to 0.917 (≈11/12) in 
1974 and 1 from 1975 on.  DDUM2003 is zero before 2003, 0.5 in 2003 and 1 in the years thereafter. DDUM2004 is zero before 2004, 0.67 (≈2/3) in 2004 and 1 
in the years thereafter.  
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Table B2. The number of observations by countries in different cases 
Country Current 
number 
Number of 
observations 
Are timeseries 
for Gini-index 
available? 
Is the country 
involved in 
simulation 
experiment I? 
Is the country 
involved in 
simulation 
experiment II? 
Afghanistan   1 23 No Yes Yes 
Albania   2 19 Yes No Yes 
Algeria   3 39 Yes Yes Yes 
Angola   4 24 No No Yes 
Argentina    5 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Armenia    6 11 Yes No Yes 
Australia    7 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Austria    8 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Azerbaijan    9 13 Yes No Yes 
Bahrain    11 10 No No Yes 
Bangladesh    12 35 Yes No Yes 
Belarus    14 17 Yes No Yes 
Belgium    15 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Benin    17 5 No No No 
Bhutan   18 14 No No Yes 
Bolivia   19 37 Yes Yes Yes 
Bosnia 
Herzegovina 20 18 
No No Yes 
Botswana   21 33 Yes No Yes 
Brazil   22 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Brunei    23 9 No No Yes 
Bulgaria    24 35 Yes Yes Yes 
Burundi 26 11 No No Yes 
Cambodia 27 12 Yes No Yes 
Cameroon 28 35 Yes No Yes 
Canada 29 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Cape Verde 30 14 No No Yes 
Chile 33 39 Yes Yes Yes 
China 34 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Colombia   35 39 Yes Yes Yes 
Congo    37 39 No Yes Yes 
Congo Brazzaville  38 33 No No Yes 
Costa Rica   39 33 Yes No Yes 
Cote Divoire    40 35 Yes No Yes 
Croatia    41 18 Yes No Yes 
Cuba    42 17 No No Yes 
Cyprus    43 26 Yes No Yes 
Czech Republic   44 17 Yes No Yes 
Denmark    45 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Dominican 
Republic  
47 
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Yes No Yes 
Ecuador    48 35 Yes No Yes 
Egypt    49 42 Yes Yes Yes 
El Salvador   50 10 Yes No Yes 
Eritrea 52 16 No No Yes 
Estonia    53 19 Yes No Yes 
Ethiopia    54 42 No Yes Yes 
Finland    56 42 Yes Yes Yes 
France    57 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Gambia    59 35 No No Yes 
Germany    61 39 Yes Yes Yes 
Ghana    62 39 No Yes Yes 
Greece    63 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Guatemala   65 31 Yes No Yes 
Guinea    66 10 Yes Yes Yes 
Guyana 68 2 No No No 
Honduras 70 11 Yes No Yes 
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Table B2 (Continued) 
Country Current 
number 
Number of 
observations 
Are timeseries 
for Gini-index 
available? 
Is the country 
involved in 
simulation 
experiment I? 
Is the country 
involved in 
simulation 
experiment II? 
Hong Kong 71 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Hungary 72 39 Yes Yes Yes 
Iceland 73 42 No Yes Yes 
India  74 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Indonesia 75 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Iran 76 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Iraq 77 24 No No Yes 
Ireland 78 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Israel 79 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Italy 80 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Jamaica 81 28 Yes Yes Yes 
Japan 82 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Jordan  83 26 Yes Yes Yes 
Kazakhstan 84 13 Yes No No 
Kenya  85 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Kuwait 86 20 No No Yes 
Kyrgyzstan 87 7 Yes No No 
Laos  88 12 No No Yes 
Latvia 89 19 Yes No Yes 
Lebanon 90 39 No Yes Yes 
Liberia  92 26 No Yes Yes 
Libya  93 35 No Yes Yes 
Lithuania   94 19 Yes No Yes 
Luxembourg  95 35 Yes No Yes 
Macao  96 10 No No No 
Macedonia  97 16 Yes No Yes 
Madagascar  98 35 Yes No Yes 
Malawi  99 11 Yes No Yes 
Malaysia  100 35 Yes No Yes 
Mali  102 24 Yes No Yes 
Malta  103 19 No No Yes 
Mauritius  105 14 Yes No Yes 
Mexico  106 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Moldova  108 11 Yes No Yes 
Mongolia  109 13 No No Yes 
Morocco  111 39 Yes Yes Yes 
Mozambique  112 28 No No Yes 
Namibia  113 18 No No Yes 
Nepal  114 34 No Yes Yes 
Netherlands  115 42 Yes Yes Yes 
New Zealand  116 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Nicaragua  117 24 Yes No Yes 
Nigeria  119 40 Yes Yes Yes 
Oman  121 26 No No Yes 
Pakistan  122 39 Yes Yes Yes 
Paraguay  125 29 Yes Yes Yes 
Peru  126 39 Yes Yes Yes 
Philippines  127 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Poland  128 39 Yes Yes Yes 
Portugal  129 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Qatar  131 35 No No Yes 
Romania  132 33 Yes Yes Yes 
Russia  133 18 Yes No Yes 
Rwanda  134 19 No No Yes 
Saudi Arabia  137 34 No No Yes 
Senegal  138 18 Yes No Yes 
Sierra Leone  140 30 No No Yes 
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Table B2 (Continued) 
Country Current 
number 
Number of 
observations 
Are timeseries 
for Gini-index 
available? 
Is the country 
involved in 
simulation 
experiment I? 
Is the country 
involved in 
simulation 
experiment II? 
Singapore  141 35 Yes No Yes 
Slovakia  142 17 Yes No Yes 
Slovenia  143 7 Yes No Yes 
Somalia  145 27 No No Yes 
South Africa  146 42 Yes Yes Yes 
South Korea  147 39 Yes Yes Yes 
Spain  148 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Sri Lanka  149 35 Yes No Yes 
Sudan  152 36 No Yes Yes 
Swaziland  154 6 No No Yes 
Sweden  155 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Switzerland  156 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Syria  157 29 No No Yes 
Tajikistan  158 6 Yes No No 
Tanzania  159 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Thailand  160 39 Yes Yes Yes 
Togo  162 16 No No Yes 
Trinidad and Tobago  164 30 No No Yes 
Tunisia  165 39 Yes Yes Yes 
Turkey  166 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Uganda  168 33 Yes Yes Yes 
Ukraine  169 18 Yes No Yes 
United Arab Emirates 170 25 No No Yes 
United Kingdom  171 42 Yes Yes Yes 
United States  172 42 Yes Yes Yes 
Uruguay  173 20 Yes Yes Yes 
Uzbekistan  174 10 Yes No Yes 
Venezuela  176 40 Yes Yes Yes 
Vietnam  177 34 Yes Yes Yes 
Yemen  178 12 Yes No Yes 
Zambia  179 38 Yes Yes Yes 
Zimbabwe  180 31 No Yes Yes 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
185 19 No No Yes 
Total  4,220    
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Table B3. Countries included in estimations involving the origin unemployment rate1 
Country Current number 
Australia   7 
Austria   8 
Belgium   15 
Canada   29 
Czech Republic   44 
Denmark   45 
Estonia   53 
Finland   56 
France   57 
Germany   61 
Greece   63 
Hungary   72 
Icelanda   73 
Ireland   78 
Israel   79 
Italy   80 
Japan   82 
Luxembourg   95 
Mexico   106 
Netherlands   115 
New Zealand   116 
Poland   128 
Portugal   129 
Slovakia   142 
South Korea   147 
Spain   148 
Sweden   155 
Switzerland   156 
Turkey   166 
United Kingdom   171 
United States   172 
1In the estimation where both the Gini ratio variable and the origin unemployment rate are used as regressors. Iceland is omitted since one does not have access 
to a time series of Gini coefficents for this country. 
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Table B4. Countries omitted from the econometric analyses and their total number of immi-
grants to Norway 1967−2010 
Country Current 
number
Total number of immigrants 1967−2010
Bahamas  10 76
Barbados 13 68
Belize 16 20
Burkina Faso  25 52
Central African Republic 31 9
Chad  32 32
Comoros  36 6
Djibouti  46 88
Equatorial Guinea  51 30
Fiji  55 62
Gabon  58 124
Grenada  64 38
Guinea Bissau  67 41
Haiti  69 49
Lesotho  91 72
Maldives  101 58
Mauritania  104 33
Micronesia 107 9
Niger  118 86
Panama  123 131
Papua New Guinea  124 39
Puerto Rico  130 13
Samoa  135 20
Sao Tome and Principe  136 2
Salomon Islands  144 6
St. Lucia  150 13
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  151 12
Suriname  153 46
Timor Leste  161 33
Tonga  163 18
Turkmenistan  167 50
Vanuatu  175 3
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Appendix C. Description of migration policy dummies 
In 1957 a law concerning foreigners was passed (“Fremmedloven”), basically enacting a liberal 
regime for immigration to Norway. One could come to Norway without a work permit and apply for 
the permit after having arrived. There was no assessment of skill requirements for work, and after two 
years of residence you were granted permanent residence permit. In 1971 this law was slightly 
modified. A potential immigrant had to apply for work before coming to Norway and had to have 
arranged for some kind of accommodation before a permit was granted.27 In 1975 this rather liberal 
regime was formally modified by the introduction of new regulations based on the 1957 law. Changes 
took place in how the law was enforced, and included a ban on general work permits: the employers 
now had to confirm that the immigrant was a specialist, the work had to last at least one year, and the 
immigrant had to be literate (in his or her mother tongue). However, there were also some elements of 
liberalisation relating to possibilities of family reunions. We introduce a policy dummy for this change 
specified as a step dummy since this change has been in effect ever since. There were preliminary 
changes introduced in February 1974 and formally made in 1975 so the variable DDUM1974 is zero 
until 1973 and 1 for the years 1975−2009 and roughly 0.9 in 1974. In principle all (non-Nordic) 
countries are affected by the dummy and we expect the estimated effect of the policy change to be 
negative. 
 
In 1977 a change in a regulation was introduced stating that residence would not be granted to persons 
entering Norway illegally. We expect DUM1977 (that is zero before 1977 and one thereafter) to enter 
with a negative sign. In 1981 a number of minor changes to immigration rules were introduced that 
generally made it easier for immigrants to enter and stay. Foreigners coming to Norway to study or go 
to school would be granted a residence permit and foreign students were also given a work permit. 
When studies had been completed it was made easier for foreigners to remain and work in Norway. A 
step dummy (DUM1981) is introduced, taking on the value of one from 1981 being zero before that 
year. We expect the effect of this dummy to enter with a positive sign. 
 
In 1991 a number of minor changes in how immigration policies were practised took place. Family 
reunion was made easier and immigrants without a residence permit were granted a residence permit 
while the application was considered. Some minor changes were of a more restrictive nature, but all in 
                                                     
27 In line with the policy dummies introduced in this section one could ask why we have not tried to estimate any effect of the 
1971 change in regulations. The answer is that we have tried but the result was that the estimated coefficient had the wrong 
sign and was also insignificant perhaps due to few observations before 1971. This result is available upon request.  
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all we expect these changes captured by DUM1991 to have a positive effect on immigration from 1991 
and onwards.  
 
Norway joined the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1994. In practice this meant that citizens of the 
EU gained free access to work in Norway for three months or to stay for six months as job-seekers, as 
well as getting in principle the same social benefits as Norwegian citizens. Although there was a time 
limit to the length of residence without obtaining a residence permit, there were in practice unlimited 
possibilities for extensions. We expect DUM1994 to enter with a positive sign for all members of the 
EEA.  
 
In 1997 a liberalisation took place in accordance with the Geneva-convention on how refugees should 
be handled by the immigration authorities in Norway. The changes were related to immigrants from 
countries in civil war. DUM1997 is not expected to affect many countries and therefore not to be 
important for overall immigration but is expected to enter with a positive sign. 
 
Another liberalisation took place in 1998 affecting people who are persecuted in their home country 
for various reasons. The rules regarding refugees were to be interpreted in a more liberal way. We 
expect DUM1998 to affect immigration to Norway positively and (in principle) affect all countries.  
 
In 1999 the UN convention on children and women was made part of the Norwegian legislation. In 
addition work permits were given for different lengths of time and did not expire automatically after 
two years. All these changes are expected to lead DUM1999 to enter with a positive sign. The changes 
are expected to affect all countries. 
 
In 2000 a liberalisation took place relating to work permits for specialists with competences that are in 
excess demand in the Norwegian labour market. DUM2000A is expected to enter with a positive sign. 
Also Iraqis were granted easier access to Norway captured by DUM2000B.  
 
In 2001 Norway joined the Schengen agreement that identifies countries covered by a common policy 
for issuing short term visitors’ visa that are valid for all visits to all countries that are party to the 
convention. It also extends the area where as a citizen of a member country you do not need a passport to 
enter one of the other member countries (but you may need another form of identity document). The 
Schengen agreement covers most members of the EU as well as all EFTA countries, but not all member 
countries joined in 2001. The convention may have limited immigration to Norway for some non-
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Schengen countries. We capture the effect of the Schengen agreement by two intervention dummies, 
labelled DUM2001A and DUM2001B. The former is directed to the Schengen countries, whereas the 
latter is directed towards the countries outside the Schengen area. A priori we expect DUM2001A to 
enter with a positive effect and DUM2001B with a negative effect.  
 
The liberalisation of 1997 was partly reversed in May 2003. Former asylum applicants had previously 
been exempted from the requirement to provide for family member applying for a residence permit. From 
2003 this exemption would no longer apply to those families whose reference person had been granted a 
residence permit on humanitarian grounds following an asylum application, as long s/he had not yet been 
granted a permanent residence permit. In practice this tightening of rules applied mainly to immigrants 
from Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and former Yugoslavia, although in theory it is more general. So 
DDUM2003 is zero before 2003, equal to one half in 2003 and one thereafter, and is expected to enter 
with a negative sign. 
 
In 2004 a number of countries joined the EU and citizens of these countries then also gained easier 
access to Norway. Some transition rules were put in place (lifted in 2007 and 2009) but it seems that in 
practice they limited immigration only marginally. Thus, DDUM2004 affects only the new members 
of the EU from that year and is expected to affect immigration from these countries positively.  
In 2005 two changes in policy were introduced, enabling Iraqis and Vietnamese boat refugees (or near 
relatives) living in the Philippines easier access to Norway. Hence DUM2005 only applies to Iraq and 
The Philippines.28 The dummy is expected to affect immigration from these two countries positively. 
 
A more restrictive policy was introduced in 2006. Foreigners who had arrived on tourist visa and then 
applied for family reunion were now less likely to be granted residence. This applied in principle to all 
countries and DUM2006 is expected to enter with a negative sign. 
 
In 2007 a number of changes in regulations affecting potential immigrants from EEA countries as well 
as more generally were made. The new EU members in 2004 were included in the Schengen area. This 
is captured by the dummy DUM2007A. Bulgaria and Romania became members of the EU but with 
some restrictions on access to Norway (parallel to those imposed on new EU-members in 2004). The 
effect of this is captured by DUM2007EU. Asylum seekers whose application was rejected and who 
had not managed to return within 3 years, from no fault of their own, could be granted a residence 
                                                     
28 Note that because our statistics are for country of previous residence, not citizenship the dummy applies to the Philippines 
and Iraq and not Vietnam.  
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permit. We expect DUM2007B to enter with a positive sign and apply to all countries except the EU 
and EEA countries. All these dummies are expected to enter with a positive sign.  
 
2008 saw a tightening of rules related to family reunion when authorities made it more difficult for 
family members to enter if the ability to provide for the family was not met. DUM2008 is expected to 
enter with a negative sign. 
  
Finally in 2009 transitional restriction affecting the countries that joined EU in 2004 (except Cyprus 
and Malta) are lifted and the DUM2009A is expected to enter with a positive sign but to affect only 
citizens of those countries. In 2009 Switzerland joins Schengen and this is captured by DUM2009B.29 
                                                     
29 The Norwegian implementation of the EU Free Movements Directive from 1. October 2009, cf. Footnote 1, was too late to 
be included in this analysis.  
Statistics Norway
Oslo:
PO Box  8131 Dept
NO-0033 Oslo
Telephone: + 47 21 09 00 00
Telefax: + 47 21 09 00 40
Kongsvinger:
NO-2225 Kongsvinger
Telephone: + 47 62 88 50 00
Telefax: + 47 62 88 50 30
E-mail: ssb@ssb.no
Internet: www.ssb.no
ISSN 0809-733X
Returadresse:
Statistisk sentralbyrå
NO-2225 KongsvingerB
